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//. JURISDICTION
The Judicial Code of Utah states, "The Court of Appeals has
appellate jurisdiction . . . over appeals from district court involving
domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce,
annulment, property division, child custody, support, visitation,
adoption, and paternity." Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(i) (1995).
The underlying matter was a divorce and the issue on appeal
concerns property division; therefore, this Court has appropriate
jurisdiction to consider this appeal.
///. ISSUE FOR REVIEW
A. Statement ofIssue
Plaintiff is appealing the equal division of a marital asset which
existed at the time of the Parties' separation but which had been spent
by the time of trial some twenty-seven months later.

It is well

established in Utah law that the marital estate should be valued as of
the time of the divorce decree. Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218
(Utah 1980);

Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695 (Utah 1985); Howell v.

Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). While acknowledging this
general rule in Morgan v. Morgan, this Court held that such is not
intractable; [hjowever, the trial court's findings must be sufficiendy
detailed to explain its basis for deviating from the general rule. 795
P.2d 684, 688 (Utah App. 1990).
In the case before this Court, since the value of the marital asset
of $10,377 in a money market account on December 17, 1993, which
had not been a part of a pension plan for more than four years, was
zero at the time of the Decree of Divorce, Plaintiff contends that the
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division of this marital asset by the trial court without making anv
findings to substantiate its deviation from established precedent was
clearly erroneous, contrary to Utah law and an abuse of the court's
discretion.
B. Standard ofReview
Trial courts have considerable discretion in determining . . .
property distribution in divorce cases, and will be upheld on appeal
unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated.
Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Findings of fact in divorce appeals are subject to the clearly erroneous
standard of review such that "due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses."
Utah R.Civ.P. 52 (a); Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah Ct. App.
1989). Conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness and given no
special deference on appeal. Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990).
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
The underlying case giving rise to the issue on appeal is a divorce
action. After twenty-six years of marriage, the Parties seeking to
divorce separated on January 7, 1994 and Plaintiff filed for divorce at
the end of that month. The matter came on for trial March 14, 1996,
some twenty-six plus months from the Parties' separation.
Defendant claimed at trial that Plaintiff had a money market
account containing over ten thousand dollars as of December 17, 1993,
twenty-seven months earlier. He produced no evidence that any of
2

this asset remained at pretrial much less at trial because it did not. He
produced no evidence that Plaintiff dissipated this asset improperly.
To the contrary, Plaintiff testified at trial she spent this asset to
maintain the mortgage, pay on marital debts and support herself.
Defendant produced evidence at trial that he paid a total of only
$100 on marital debt for the entire twenty-seven months of this
action's pendency in spite of having been court-ordered on April 25,
1994 to maintain payments to six creditors, two of which were nonmarital creditors on accounts in his name.
Without any evidence to justify its decisions, the trial court
distributed the Parties' assets/liabihties all to Defendant's decided
advantage and Plaintiffs decided detriment. The trial court awarded
Defendant the equity in the marital property determined at the time of
trial so that he received the benefit of the twenty-seven mortgage
payments Plaintiff made without offset for having made all those
payments herself.

Then it awarded Defendant half the value,

determined at the time of separation, of an asset Plaintiff had no choice
but to consume because her income alone, especially after IRS
garnishments, was insufficient to maintain the mortgage, the marital
debts Plaintiff was court-ordered to pay in addition to the debts
Defendant failed to pay that she paid and to support herself as well.
Plaintiff appeals the trial court's deviation, without making any
findings to substantiate it, from established precedent as being clearly
erroneous, contrary to Utah law and an abuse of the court's discretion.
B. Statement Of The Facts

In 1989, Marriott Inc., Plaintiffs employer sold its air catering
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division to Caterair International and dispersed its pension holdings of
its former employees to those employees. Plaintiff continued on in the
employment of Caterair. Plaintiff received $24,247 less $2172.97 in
Federal taxes withheld or a total of $22,074.03 on February 22, 1990.
(Appendix a-1 & a-2). She intended to roll this distribution over
within the next year but paid on marital debts instead. By December
17, 1993, she had only $10,377.26 of the original amount left in a
money market account where she had placed it after it was disbursed.
(Appendix a- 3).
The Parties separated in early January, 1994 and Plaintiff filed
for divorce on January 31, 1994. (R-l through 6). Plaintiffs net pay at
that time had been approximately $1000 per month. (R-27) Besides a
mortgage payment of $434 per month which Plaintiff continued to pay
as she had always done, she initially had to pay over $500 in overdue
utility bills she discovered Defendant had not paid in order to prevent
these services from being terminated. (R-26 & R-29 through 30,
respectively). In addition, she continued to maintain payments on
other marital debts, her own maintenance, transportation expenses,
monthly utilities, attorney fees and court costs, etc. (R-27, 29 through
30).
Shortly after the Parties' separation the IRS began garnishing
Plaintiffs wages. For March and April of 1994, her take home pay was
approximately $200 per month. (R-28). Also after the separation, she
discovered Defendant had been lying about having paid property taxes
he assured her he was paying and that none had been paid since 1990.
Plaintiff paid $1900 in March, 1994, just prior to the IRS' garnishment
of her wages, for three years' back taxes on the marital residence. (R4

29). She had already just paid the IRS and the Utah tax commission
$500 each for back income taxes to try to prevent garnishments the
IRS imposed anyway. (R-29). She had no choice but to rely on the
monies in the money market account to pay on debts and her own
maintenance. (R-166 through 167).
A Motion Hearing for Temporary Relief came before the court
commissioner on April 25, 1994. In the minute entry of that hearing,
the court ordered Plaintiff to maintain the mortgage and three
obligations owed to Cypress Credit Union. (R-53). Defendant was
ordered to maintain, among other obligations, $100 monthly payments
on the IRS tax liability as well as "make arrangements with the state
tax commissioner to pay sum each month to prevent any further
collection efforts against either party." Id. Each was to "maintain those
debts in their [sic] own names." Id. Defendant was allowed to keep all
his earned income and his AT & T pension income of $213 per month
to enable him to maintain the debts as ordered (no temporary
alimony). Id.
At trial, Defendant produced only one bona fide receipt
evidencing he made one $100 payment to the IRS on July 14,1994 and
no other evidence of having maintained any other marital debt
obligations as ordered. (Appendix a-6). At trial, he also produced a
letter dated August 5, 1994 from the state tax commission indicating
he had been granted a hardship status deferring any requirements of
payment from him for twelve months during which time the interest
and penalties would continue to accrue. (Appendix a-7). This did not
prevent the state from going after and seizing Plaintiffs returns,
however. Apparently Defendant neglected to file any income tax
5

returns since the last joint filing with Plaintiff in 1993 (not submitted
on discovery requests). Most likely he did not file in order to avoid
seizure of any refunds due him.
In the Second Amended Decree of Divorce, the court has ordered
the parties to pay all marital debts owing out of the equity in the
marital home. (R-365). Because interest and penalties continued to
accumulate on the unpaid state taxes and all other marital debts
Defendant was ordered to pay but did not, Plaintiff has been further
penalized by having to "pay" half the penalties and interest that have
accumulated on the unpaid debts Defendant was to have paid that were
in his or both their names. Debts Defendant was ordered to maintain
that were in Plaintiffs name, Plaintiff maintained when she discovered
Defendant was not paying on these. The penalties and interest plus the
unpaid principal on these marital debts obviously amount to more than
was initially owed on the debts in the first place, again to Plaintiffs
detriment while Defendant kept his pension and income to do with
whatever he wanted, resulting in further serious inequity.
What with no help from Defendant toward paying marital debts
in spite of having been court-ordered to do so, Plaintiff used all her
income, all the remainder of the pension she had intended to roll over
years earlier but paid on debts Defendant neglected since she received
it both before and after the Parties' separation, and still she had to
borrow money from her family in order to live. (R-166 through 167).
Plaintiff has been unable to repay the monies she has had to borrow
from family.
Plaintiff testified at trial that she had no control of Marriott's
dispersion of her pension funds. (Transcript-3 @ 10-12 & Transcript-5
6

@ 13-14). She testified that Defendant was unemployed and unable to
make house payments at the time, so these funds were used to pay
marital debts and that although Defendant promised to replace them
for "their retirement," he never did. (Transcript-1 @ 10-17). Plaintiff
also testified that she had over ten thousand dollars remaining in a
money market account prior to the Parties' separation. (Transcript-3 @
13-14 & Transcript-7 @ 7). Plaintiff said that she paid marital debts
with that money and that she had none of it left. (Transcript-3 @ 1619; Transcript-7 @18-25; Transcript-8 @ 1-6 & 25 & Transcript-9 @110) also see (R-166 through 167).
At trial, no testimony was solicited from Defendant (nor from any
other witness) that Plaintiff did not, in fact, pay these debts as she
testified. Credibility of conflicting testimonies is not nor was at issue.
No evidence was produced that Plaintiff had/has hidden this money
nor dissipated these funds improperly not acted obstructively, yet the
trial court treated her as though she had done one or more of these
without any evidence of wrongdoing before it and without any findings
to substantiate such so as to support its deviation from established
precedent.
The trial court awarded Defendant all his retirement and pension
income. (R-364). He was allowed to keep his Brasher's retirement
valued at approximately $2000 at the time of trial. The value of
Defendant's AT & T pension depends solely on how many more years
he lives to collect the $213 per month he currently receives and has
been receiving even before the Parties separated. He has enjoyed the
exclusive use of these monthly payments for three years since the
separation amounting to approximately $7500. Although the court
7

awarded Plaintiff her presently accumulated pension plan valued at
approximately $16,000 at trial, before she can begin to draw on her
retirement, Defendant will have realized four times the three-year
payout he has already received. Yet the Court then awarded half the
amount remaining as of December, 1993 from Plaintiffs Marriott reimbursed funds (which had not been a pension plan for four years by the
time the parties separated and that she was compelled to spend to pay
the Parties' debts and to support herself) to Defendant in addition to
the inequitable division of the Parties' retirement monies.
Rather than punishing Defendant's disregard of its orders, the
trial court rewarded Defendant's contempt for its orders by obviously
favoring him in its final decree. Plaintiff obeyed the orders as directed
by the trial court yet she was significantly shortchanged. The court
provided no reason for this inequitable distribution of the Parties' asset
and debt allocation. Its orders appear capricious and a clear abuse of
its discretion.
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The trial court deviated from the standards set by this court for
determining the value of a certain marital asset, namely a money
market account that contained more than ten thousand dollars just
prior to the Parties' separation but did not exist at the time of trial
twenty-seven months later, by awarding half the monies determined at
the time the Parties separated, to Defendant. Although according to
these standards, any such deviation should have been supported by
sufficiently detailed findings to explain its basis for deviating from the
general rule, the trial court provided no, much less sufficiently detailed
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findings for its deviation.
On the contrary, all evidence and testimony at trial supported
Plaintiffs position that she did not dissipate, hide nor act obstructively
regarding this asset but that she was compelled to spend the asset on
(1) maintaining debts she and Defendant were court-ordered to pay
(something he did not do); (2) paying all the mortgage payments on the
marital property for which she is to receive no offset even though
Defendant benefits from her twenty-seven payments in significantly
increased equity (mortgage reduced by Plaintiffs payments) at the
time of divorce; (3) and supporting herself. The trial court provided
Plaintiff no allowance for self-maintenance costs while Defendant
freely spent all his income without having to account for his failure to
maintain those debts he was ordered to pay.
VI. ARGUMENT

In Bernham v. Bernham, this Court held that trial courts in
divorce proceedings are given considerable discretion in adjusting the
parties' financial and property interests. 716 P.2d 781, 782 (Utah
1986). The trial court's actions are presumed valid, and to overcome
that presumption, the appealing party must demonstrate that there
was "misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in
substantial and prejudicial error, or that the evidence clearly
preponderated against the findings, or that such a serious inequity has
resulted from the order as to constitute an abuse of the trial court's
discretion." Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 789 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)
[quoting McCrary v. McCrary, 599 P.2d 1248, 1250 (Utah Ct. App.
1987)]. Plaintiff argues that the trial court misapplied the law
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resulting in substantial and prejudicial error and that a serious
inequity has resulted from its orders as to constitute an abuse of the
trial court's discretion.
In Peck v. Peck, this Court held that although assets are
generally valued at the time of the divorce decree, the trial court may
value the property at an earlier date where one party has dissipated an
asset, hidden its value or otherwise acted obstructively. 738 P.2d
1050,1052 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Likewise, this Court upheld the trial
court's deviation to value the marital estate at an earlier time than at
trial in Jefferies v. Jefferies because the trial court found that the
husband's transfer of money from the marital estate to the children
dissipated marital assets in an attempt to hide these from the wife.
985 P.2d 835, 838 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
No allegations were asserted at any time during the pendency of
the present action nor was evidence introduced at trial to suggest
Plaintiff "dissipated" this asset, hid its value or otherwise acted
obstructively. In fact, to the contrary, Plaintiff testified at trial as to
how this money was utilized. Defendant did not challenge Plaintiffs
testimony concerning this asset, how it was used nor did he produce
any evidence that Plaintiff might have hidden this asset from him at
the time of trial. Defendant did not dispute that this asset was gone.
In Andersen v. Andersen, the facts adduced at trial indicated that
defendant held an IRA worth over $8000 on July of 1986. Two months
later and after the parties separated, defendant cashed the IRA, taking
over $4000 and transferring $4000 to another bank certificate. Within
a month after that, he cashed the $4000 certificate. At trial held
approximately six months later, defendant testified only $3300
10

remained of that IRA "but did not explain disposition of the remainder
of the funds." 757 P.2d 476, 479 (Utah App. 1988). This Court
remanded this issue to the trial court to determine how the money was
spent.
Over a period of twenty-seven months in the current case,
Plaintiff used a money market account of about twice the amount that
defendant in Andersen consumed in only seven months; however, she
testified how those monies were expended. Id. The Court made no
finding, as it did in Andersen, as to the disposable income of the parties
after paying the court-ordered marital debts and in Plaintiffs case, the
taxes and debts Defendant failed to pay. Id. It is only equitable that
an individual be allowed at least something on which to live. Where
Plaintiff was forced by garnishment to pay Defendant's court-ordered
obligations while trying to maintain those she was ordered to pay and
those he was ordered to pay and did not, that she would have to rely
on something other than her income (i.e. the money market account
and loans from family members) to pay on the marital debts as well as
pay for her own maintenance should have been obvious to the trial
court.
In its decision to divide a non-existent asset and only allow
Plaintiff an offset against marital debt paid and holding mortgage
payments would not be considered marital debt, the trial court failed to
provide Plaintiff any allowance for even marginal living expenses. It
placed no such burden on Defendant. He was allowed to keep all his
earnings and pension benefits he received during this period to spend
however he wished during these same twenty-seven months without
paying, as ordered, on the marital debts. Then he was allowed to enjoy
11

the increased equity in the marital home that Plaintiff bought down by
maintaining the mortgage, again without any findings to Justify this
disparate and inequitable treatment.
In Morgan v. Morgan II, this Court held that it is well settled that
the present value . . . of retirement accounts accrued during the
marriage, are marital assets and... should be valued as of the time of
the divorce and should be equitably divided. 854 P.2d 559 (Utah App.
1993). The value of Appellant's retirement account with Marriott was
zero on February 21, 1990. It was still zero at the time of trial.
Plaintiff had no Marriott retirement account valued at $10,377 as of
December 17, 1993. Yet the trial court held this to be a retirement
account to be divided as a retirement benefit. This characterization is
not consistent with the facts and therefore clearly erroneous.
In Shepherd v. Shepherd, plaintiff challenged the trial court's
decision to value the marital estate at the time of separation rather
than at the time of trial. 876 P.2d 429, 433 (Utah App. 1994). There
the trial court made detailed findings that plaintiff not only used more
of the marital assets than authorized but had seriously depleted the
marital estate. Based on these detailed findings, this Court held that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in valuing the marital estate
at the date of separation rather than the date of trial. Id.
Not only did the trial court use a date other than the date of
divorce to determine the value of a single marital asset without
supporting its decision with any findings of fact explaining its deviation
from the general rule, but assuming it may have deviated because it
found Plaintiff used all the asset, it made no finding that she did so
wrongfully. Plaintiff maintains that it should have used the same date
12

to evaluate all the marital estate rather than arbitrarily and
capriciously picking and choosing which assets were to be evaluated at
the time of separation versus at the time of divorce without providing
any justification in its findings for obviously favoring Defendant
financially by selecting different times to value different marital
property as it did.
The trial court's decision has resulted in Plaintiffs being required
to pay for half an asset she no longer has while she was compelled to
use all her assets including the expended money market account to
significantly reduce the mortgage on the marital real property and
increase Defendant's equity based on her buy down of the mortgage
and the inflationary increase in the property's value over twentyseven months. However viewed, this decision requires Plaintiff to pay
twice and Defendant benefits even though he came before the court
with unclean hands by not paying, other than making a token attempt,
on the marital debts as ordered. The result is neither equitable nor
substantiated by the trial court's findings.
Finally, in Rappleye v. Rappleye, this court determined that the
evidence before the trial court indicated that a certain cash account had
a negative balance at the time of trial but that that court valued the
account at the time of the parties' separation two years prior to trial
without any subsidiary findings to support its determination [emphasis
added]. 855 P.2d 260, 262 (Utah App. 1993). This Court held that
because such valuation is contrary to the general rule that the marital
estate is valued at the time of the divorce decree, the trial court's
decision was vacated and the issue remanded to the trial court for
more detailed findings regarding the date at which the account should
13

be valued, as well as its basis for valuing it as of such date [emphasis
added]. Id. at 263.
As in Rappleye, Plaintiff maintains the trial court, without justification, erred by establishing the value of a marital asset twenty-seven
months before trial when that asset did not exist at trial while
providing no findings of fact, much less sufficiently detailed findings, to
explain its basis for such a deviation. Id.
VII. CONCLUSION
According to its decision in Munns v. Munns, this Court has held
that the trial court is allowed considerable discretion regarding the
division of marital property, as long as it exercises its discretion in
accordance with the standards set bv the appellate courts [emphasis
added]. 790 P.2d 116, 118 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Those standards
include that the marital estate should be valued as of the time of the
divorce decree and any deviations from this general rule must
substantiated by sufficiently detailed findings to explain its basis for
deviating from that general rule.
I

In the present case, the value of some of the marital assets were

determined as of the time of the divorce, but another was determined
as of the time of separation resulting in substantial prejudice favoring
Defendant to PlaintifFs detriment and resulting in a serious inequity as
to the division of the Parties' assets and liabilities. The trial court made
no findings and Defendant produced no evidence of wrongdoing by
Plaintiff to justify the court's deviations.
Plaintiff seeks relief as a result of this appeal from the burdens
imposed on her by the trail court's apparently arbitrary decision to
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pick and choose when to value certain assets and liabilities so that the
Parties enjoy a truly equitable property division as a result of their
divorce. She maintains the value of all the marital assets, the marital
estate, should either be determined as of the time of divorce or all the
assets should be valued as of the time of separation.
If the marital estate is valued at the time of divorce, the money
market account is zero and the Defendant benefits from the increased
equity in the marital home due to inflation and the mortage buy-down
by Plaintiff. If the marital estate is valued at the time of separation,
Defendant receives half the money market account but not the benefit
of Plaintiffs twenty-seven mortgage payments.

Either of these

determinations is far more equitable than what the trial court did.
Plaintiff is not guilty of depleting the marital estate over the
pendency of this action. In fact, she is the only Party who made any
attempt to preserve it (and she went without even basic necessities
during this time in order to do so). Defendant, on the other hand, did
not pay on the debts he was ordered to maintain thereby depleting the
marital estate through increased penalties and interest both Parties
have been ordered to pay.
VII. REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Plaintiff does not believe that oral argument would materially
assist the Court's consideration of this matter. She can add little more
than they has already put into writing within this document.
DATED this 25th day of November, 1996.
Karen S. Peterson
Attorney for Appellant/Plaintiff
15

IX. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served two true and correct copies of the
foregoing brief on Tineke Van Dijk, attorney for Appellee/Defendant,
by hand-delivering them on this 25 th day of November, 1996, to her
office located at 243 East 400 South, #301, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.
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APPENDIX
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Department of the Treasury

** IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS, **
** REFER TO THIS INFORMATION: **
NUMBER OF THIS NOTICE: CP-521
DATE OF THIS NOTICE: 01-18-95
TAXPAYER IDENT. NUM: 528-44-9698
TAX FORM: 1040
TAX PERIOD: 12-31-90

* n t e r n a ' Revenue Service

QGDEN, UT

84201

l.iilll.lillllil.M.M.I.l...!u..I.I..II..I.I...Ml....ll.,llll

DUANE G & V ARLENE WEIDEMAN
1634 THORNHILL DRIVE APT 208
SALT LAKE CITY UT
84123-5936342

[^DEFENDANT'S

FOR ASSISTANCE CALL:

IWmm^

1-800-829-1040

YOUR NEXT PAYMENT IS DUE SOON
Your next payment of $100.00 is due on 01-28-95 as
required by your installment agreement. Please tear off the payment
voucher from the end of this notice and send it in the enclosed
envelope •
The current status of your account is shown below. We apply
installment payments to tax periods in the order we assessed the
periods.
FORM NUMBER
1040
1040

CAF

TAX PERIOD ENDED

0
0

12-31-90
12-31-92

$170.22
$430.51

Payment due

$100.00

AMOUNT

Total balance owed including penalties and interest:

Please pay your future installments on time.
have to cancel your installment agreement.

If you donft we may

The federal income tax is a "pay-as-you-go" tax. You must pay the
tax as you earn or receive income during the year. There are two
easy ways to do this:
1. WITHHOLDING: If you are an employee, your employer will withhold
income tax from your pay. Tax is also withheld from other types of
income -- including pensions, bonuses, commissions, and gambling
winnings. In each case, the amount withheld is paid to the Internal
Revenue Service in your name.

a-4

063888
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* * I F V o J HAVE ANY Q U E S T I O N S ,
* * REFER TO T H I S I N F O R M A T I O N :
NUMBER OF T H I S N O T I C E :
CP-521
DATE OF T H I S N O T I C E :
03-15-95

Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service
OGDEN, UT 8 4 2 0 1

TAXPAYER IDENT. NUM: 528-44-9698
TAX FORM: 1040
TAX PERIOD: 12-31-90

l.l!lll,IHIIIII..,Mt,!.li..l..,.l.l,.!l..l.l

lllillilili

DUANE G & V ARLENE WEIDEMAN
1634 THORNHILL DRIVE APT 208
SALT LAKE CITY UT
84123-5936342

FOR ASSISTANCE CALL:

1-800-829-1040

YOUR NEXT PAYMENT IS DUE SOON
Your next payment of $100.00 is due on 03-28-95.
The current status of your account is shown below. We apply
installment payments to tax periods in the order we assessed the
periods.
FORM NUMBER
1040
1040

CAF

TAX PERIOD ENDED

0
0

12-31-90
12-31-92

AMOUNT
$71.64
$439.74

Payment due

$100.00

Total balance owed including penalties and interest:
<?&

$511.38

& W W Z ^ fit/ Hi>¥

The federal income tax is a "pay-as-you-go1* tax. You must pay the
tax as you earn or receive income during the year. There are two
easy ways to do this:
1. WITHHOLDING: If you are an employee, your employer will withhold
income tax from your pay. Tax is also withheld from other types of
income -- including pensions, bonuses, commissions, and gambling
winnings. In each case, the amount withheld is paid to the Internal
Revenue Service in your name.
If too little tax is being withheld from your wages to pay the
taxes you will owe at the end of the year, you should file a new Form
W-4, Employee's Withholding Allowance Certificate, with your employer
to change the amount of withholding.
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Department of the Treasury
internal Revenue Service
OGDEN

UT

929

01

IF YOU HAVE.ANY QUESTIONS, REFER TO THIS INFORMATION:
DATE OF NOTICE:
06-15-94
521 •
TAXPAYER IDENTIFYING NUMBER: 528-44-96 98
FORM
TAX YEAR DOCUMENT LOCATOR
ENDED
NUMBER

84201

1040
1040
DUANE G * V ARLENE WEIDEMAN
P0 BOX 701766
WEST VALLEY UT
84170-1766668

CALL*OR

12-31-90
12-31-92

,

LV

94139009
94139009

1«•800-829-1040 J
-

WRITE* CHIEF, TAXPAYER ASSISTANCE SECTION
INTERNAL. REVENUE SERVICE CENTER

m

OGDEN

ypWjW

UT

84201

IF YOU1 WRITE,, BE SURE TD ATTACH-THE BOTTOM PART OF THIS

THIS IS TO REMIND YOU THAT YOUR MONTHLY PAYMENT REQUIRED BY YOUR INSTALLMENT
AGREEMENT IS DUE ON 06-28-94, TO BE APPLIED AS FOLLOWS*
FORM NUMBER

CAF

1040
1040

AMOUNr
$358.09
$399.13

TAX PERIOD ENDED
12-31-90
12-31-92

0
0.

_-. _

\r
. .PAYMENT-JUJE
TOTAL BALANCE OWED INCLUDING PENALTIES AND INTEREST

$ioa.oo
$757.22

PLEASE RETURN THE BOTTOM PART OF THIS NOTICE WITH YOUR PAYMENT. AN ENVELOPE IS ENCLOSED
FOR YOUR. CONVENIENCE. : THANJC YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION. . .

ENCLOSURES*
ENVELOPE;

J-"' >
•
v
' -:* /; ^.

.
;

*

'.— - ~
'*....;

,~

*

-.

-\

IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS, YOU MAY CALL OR> WRITE-5EE THE INFORMATION IN THE UPPER RIGHT CORNE
OF THIS NOTICE. TQ'MAKE SURE THAT IRS EMPLOYEES*GIVE COURTEOUS RESPONSES 4ND CORRECT:
INFORMATION TO.TAXPAYERS, A SECOND IRS EMPLOYEE 50METIME3 LISTENS IN ON TELEPHONE CALLS.
KEEP THIS PART FOR YOUR RECORDS. „
V CUT HERE V

10-532921754?

;

& ;4 :*?4

^

UTAH f ~<VTE TAX COMMISSION
Michael 0 . Leavitt
Olene S. Walker
LwuUMnt Governor

W. Val Oveson, i
Roger O. Tew, <
Joe B. Pacheco, (
Alice Shearer,
Rodney G. Marrelli, EMCUUV* Director

August 5, 1994

DUANE G WEIDEMAN
P 0 BX 701766
S L CITY UT 84170-1766

RE:

ACCOUNT NO. (S) 528-44-9698

Dear Sir/Madam:
This letter is to inform you that your Income tax liability
for the period(s) 1990, 1991, 1992 has been placed in a hardship
status with the Tax Commission.
This means that we will not actively pursue collection of
these delinquent taxes over the next twelve months, at which time
we will reevaluate your ability to pay your tax liability.
Although you will not be receiving regular notices of
delinquency, interest will continue to accrue at the statutory rate
on the unpaid balance. Any tax refunds you are entitled to will be
credited to the delinquency and any tax liens that have been filed
will remain in effect until the tax liability has been satisfied.
Respectfully,

t^jsm

(JsCsiLSt&y)

Kim Carlston
Tax Compliance Agent
Collection Division
(801) 297-6210
UN s s

i
lrefflDEFENDANT'S

[EXHIBIT *****
. T4

Blaine W Smith, Director • Collections
210 North 1950 West • Salt Lake Citv, Utah 54134
Telephone (801) 297 6300 • Fax Number (801) 297 6358
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